BRI Vrs India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
Editor's Note: The author is President of the Institute of International Relations and Media Research (IIRMR). The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of Gwadar Pro.
Announced with much fanfare in 2023 at the G20 summit in India, IMEC envisions improved trade routes and connectivity between India, the Middle East, and Europe via upgraded rail and shipping links. The memorandum of understanding signed between India, the EU, the US, and Middle Eastern states like UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel aims to strengthen economic integration between Asia and Europe. However, when analyzed closely, IMEC simply does not have the financial firepower or geopolitical leverage to match China's gigantic BRI spanning over 60 countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond.
The West appears to be grappling with how to respond to China's ascendance on the global stage and its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As a result, it seems they made an IMEC announcement to garner attention. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, delivering a speech at the Annual Public Forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO), voiced his disappointment regarding the recent G20 summit's failure to effectively tackle critical global economic challenges. He underscored that despite India's diplomatic achievement in hosting the summit, it fell short of making substantial headway on crucial issues such as climate finance, the regulation of artificial intelligence, alleviating debt burdens in Africa, and addressing extreme poverty.
The most obvious advantage BRI enjoys over IMEC is its massive head start and sweeping scale, as it was started ten years in advance than the proposed IMEC. Ever since its launch in 2013, China has mobilized close to $1 trillion in investments across over 3,000 BRI-linked infrastructure projects ranging from ports, pipelines, highways, railways, power plants, and other connectivity links. Over 150 countries have signed up for BRI projects and funding, lured by the promise of upgraded trade and transit networks. From the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to railways in Laos and highways in Montenegro, BRI's tentacles stretch across vast swathes of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The mammoth scale and scope of BRI simply dwarfs the limited India-Gulf-Europe corridor envisaged under IMEC. With billions already invested and projects underway, BRI has acquired a self-sustaining momentum that will be hard for any competing initiative like IMEC to match.
A major limitation of IMEC is its lack of overland transport links and cross-border connectivity. BRI's great advantage lies in its extensive web of rail, road, and pipeline corridors providing connectivity between China and its neighbors in South, Southeast, and Central Asia. Core BRI projects like the CPEC and the New Eurasian Land Bridge consist of rail and road networks linking China with the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and beyond. IMEC in contrast is confined to maritime routes and port connectivity between India, the Gulf states, and the European Mediterranean. The lack of overland transit options robs IMEC of flexibility in cargo transport. Political differences and conflicts can easily disrupt shipping lanes. BRI's varied mix of land and sea routes makes it more resilient. With wider access to trade hubs in the Eurasian hinterland, BRI dominates in terms of cross-border connectivity.
Despite the strong opposition of the West, BRI has managed to attract interest and participation from a geopolitically diverse range of nations across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. The inclusion of countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Italy, and Nigeria shows that BRI has appeal beyond China's immediate neighborhood. The open and inclusive structure of BRI allows room for both US allies and strategically important developing countries to reap its benefits. IMEC lacks this kind of diverse and multilateral structure. It is clearly demarcated as a US-led initiative aimed at countering China.
The choice of partners like India, Israel, and UAE reveals IMEC's focus on stitching an anti-China bloc. This undermines IMEC's appeal to a wider array of countries. Its exclusion of notable players like Iran and Turkey also erodes geographic integration. BRI has adroitly positioned itself as an open architecture for global cooperation, making it more appealing, especially to developing countries.
A major reason why BRI has elicited such an avid response is because it caters to the pressing infrastructure and connectivity needs of emerging economies in regions like Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. There is genuine demand among these developing countries for the roads, railways, ports, and power projects China has been building under BRI. It fills a vital developmental gap. IMEC does not cater to similar organic developmental needs, beyond general trade facilitation.
US promises of investment under schemes like Build Back Better also failed to materialize. Unless the US manages to pool billions in infrastructure funding, IMEC will remain an aspirational concept. China's economic heft has played a crucial role in translating BRI into reality.
However, according to participants at a conference in Hong Kong marking the 10th anniversary of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI in the second week of September, as per another perspective it is good for the BRI to have competition and that more connectivity will benefit global trade. "Yeah, why not? Competition is good. The more the better. We are participating in most of them," said Khaled Mohamed Aljassim, a board director of the Chamber of Commerce & Industry in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates.
He said countries should not be pressured, however, to choose between the BRI or the IMEC and should be able to join both should they choose to. The UAE is a part of BRI but is also an IMEC signatory, along with Italy and Saudi Arabia.
